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Good international environmental governance in marine pollution matters
largely rests with effective instruments of liability and compensation for trans-
boundary environmental damage. This paper examines concepts and legal
instruments in global and regional international law for providing prompt, adequate
and effective compensation for harm to the marine environment itself, on the
example of the Southern Ocean.
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INTRODUCTION
The last century saw the fall of the vision of the oceans as an inexhaustible
reservoir of resources to be plundered and polluted by humankind at will. Ever
since the tanker Torrey Canyon ran aground on Pollard Rock on the Seven Stone
Reef in Cornwall on 18 March 1967, the international community has struggled
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with many legal, political and human dimensions of vessel-sourced pollution
incidents. Despite the extensive international legal responses to this ecological
challenge the catastrophic proportions of the 2002 Prestige and 1999 Erica
tanker spills highlight the ineffectiveness of the present approach in combating
vessel-sourced pollution.1 While ‘an ounce of prevention’ is still worth ‘a pound
of cure,’ this paper argues that good international environmental governance
in marine pollution matters largely rests with effective international instruments
of liability and compensation for transboundary environmental damage.
International liability and compensation regimes related to vessel-sourced
pollution emerged as a reaction to the unwillingness and incapability of flag
States to institute elaborate domestic regimes for remedying of transboundary
pollution damage, as well as in order to harmonise various municipal legal
systems. Namely, legal rules on liability and redress are commonly developed
on a domestic level, however, the problem of the inadequacy of such domestic
regimes is particularly evident in the sphere of marine pollution given that
almost 50 percent of the world maritime fleet is registered with the ‘flags of
convenience’ (FOC) countries,2 that offer ‘relaxed’ environmental regulation,
and a more lenient system of fines and sanctions. In response to this,
international instruments of liability and compensation were established either
in the form of a separate treaty or a supplementary element to an existing
multilateral maritime environmental agreement (MMEA). The first such
international instruments that also remain the only operative and successful
ones are the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage
[1969 CLC],3 and the 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage [1971 Fund Conven-
tion].4 Despite numerous other international agreements having since been
1 Tanker Prestige spilled some 63,000 tons of oil carried as cargo, while Erica spilled around
20,000 tons: <www.itopf.com/pastspil.html> 1 August 2005.
2 See the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Secretariat,
“2004 Review of Maritime Transport,” UNCTAD/RMT/2004, X.
3 973 UNTS 3 (in force 19 June 1975), as amended by the Protocol of 1992 to Amend the
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969, [1996] ATS No 2
(in force 30 May 1996) [hereinafter ‘1992 Liability Convention’].
4 1110 UNTS 57 (in force 16 October 1978), as amended by the Protocol of 1992 to Amend
the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for
Oil Pollution Damage 1971, [1996] ATS No 3 (in force 30 May 1996) [‘hereinafter ‘1992
Fund Convention’].
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negotiated,5 they have not come into force as yet. What is more, Daniel warns
that “of the regimes that have been developed and are not in force, there are
flaws in those regimes that have been identified.”6
This paper explores the effectiveness of MMEAs and international
environmental regimes (IERs)7 relating to remedying vessel-sourced pollution
harm. The primary measurement of effectiveness is taken to be the ability of
the relevant international instruments to provide prompt, adequate and effective
relief for damage resultant from marine pollution. Other subsidiary parameters
of effectiveness employed in this discussion include the success of the relevant
international mechanisms in deterrence, and the extent of compliance therewith.
Furthermore, this paper accentuates the need for effective remedies concerning
pure marine environmental damage, in particular when vessel-sourced pollution
affects the high seas marine environment. Unlike damage to persons or property
pursuant to pollution, damage to the environment itself, so-called pure
environmental damage, is overlooked in environmental liability regimes
domestically as well as internationally. None of the MMEAs negotiated or in
force enable compensation for the costs of clean up, and restoration of pure
environmental damage inflicted to the high seas. As a result, vessels polluting
the high seas marine environment are not subject to any international fine or
penalty.
The Southern Ocean was chosen as the case study for this paper since it is
representative of both coastal State maritime zones and the high seas, and the
5 1962 Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships [1962 Nuclear Ships
Convention] 57 AJIL 268 (1963) (not in force); 1996 International Convention on Liability
and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances
by Sea [HNS Convention] (1996) 35 ILM 1406 (not in force); 1999 Basel Protocol on
Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal [Basel Liability Protocol] UNEP/CHW.1//WG.1/9/2 (not in force);
2001 International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage [Bunkers
Convention] IMO document: LEG/CONF 12/19 of 27 March 2001 (not in force).
6 A. Daniel “Civil Liability Regimes as a Complement to Multilateral Environmental
Agreements: Sound International Policy or False Comfort” (2003)  12(3) RECIEL 225.
7 IERs are instruments of regulation slightly different to MMEAs; S Krasner “Structural
Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables” (1982) 36 (2)
International Organisation 186 defines regimes as “principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area,” hence
comprising an institutional element outside the treaty’s normative components.
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region therefore permits an assessment of the totality of the global interna-
tional law related to vessel-sourced marine pollution. The Southern Ocean is
also subject to a regional regime, the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), which
allows for a study of the interactions between global and regional instruments
in remedying environmental harm.
1. VESSEL-SOURCED MARINE POLLUTION
Vessel-sourced pollution is a wide generic term that includes accidental spills
and intentional discharges by sea-going vessels. Pollution of the marine
environment is most appropriately described in 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS]8 as:
the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into
the marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to
result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life,
hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing
and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea
water and reduction of amenities.
The 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships as
amended by the 1978 Protocol [MARPOL]9 defines vessel-sourced pollution
incidents as:
an event involving the actual or probable discharge into the sea of a harmful
substance, or effluents containing such substances.
In principle, vessel-sourced pollution comprises all categories of pollutants
originating from all types of vessels engaged in navigation or transportation.
This term extends to pollution wherever it may occur affecting the marine
environment of whichever section of the oceans and seas. 10
8 1833 UNTS 3 (in force 16 November 1994), Art. 2(4).
9 1973 MARPOL, (1973) 12 ILM 1319 (not intended to enter into force without the
1978 Protocol); 1978 Protocol, 1340 UNTS 61 (in force 2 October 1983), Art. 2(6);
MARPOL 1973 as amended by the 1978 Protocol hereinafter ‘MARPOL’.
10 The term vessel relates to: a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the marine
environment and including hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, floating
craft and fixed or floating platforms: MARPOL, art. 2(4); for more information on various
types of ships see K Van Dokkum Ship Knowledge, A Modern Encyclopaedia (2004).
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Accidental pollution by oil when carried as cargo is still believed to be the
most common pollutant originating from ships. According to International Tanker
Owners Pollution Federation Limited (ITOPF), the number of oil spills caused
by tankers has decreased dramatically since the 1970s when the annual average
of spills was 25.2, in comparison to 3.8 spills average in the period between
2000-2004.11 Despite the decrease in the number of incidents, their severity,
however, remains alarming when considering the quantities of oil spilt.12 Moreover,
contrary to general perception, the greatest threat of ecological harm from ships
comes from operational discharges, and in particular the illegal discharge of oil
through routine operations. The 2003 OECD Report indicates that:
the illegal discharge of oil into the sea through routine operations is equal
to over eight times the Exxon Valdez oil spill or over 48 times the 1997
Nakhodka spill off the coast of Japan - every year.13
Aside from oil, seaborne transport of hazardous substances carried in
packaged forms, or noxious liquid chemicals carried in bulk, also have the
potential for environmental catastrophe. The IMO warns that over 50 percent
of goods carried in dry cargo ships, including chemical tankers, are potentially
dangerous.14 Though rare, accidents involving nuclear ships or ships carrying
radioactive matter also still occur.15 In addition, it was only in the past 15
years that the scientific community managed to persuade States and maritime
related industries to address the serious detrimental effects of ballast waters
released16 in pristine marine eco-systems, the dumping of sewage and garbage
11 Statistics available from ITOPF: <www.itopf.com/stats.html> 1 August 2005.
12 According to ITOPF only in the past 15 years some 861,700 tons of oil carried as cargo
was spilt into the ocean as a result of tanker incidents; see id, table 3.
13  Maritime Transport Committee (OECD), “Costs saving from Non-Compliance with
International Environmental Regulations in the Maritime Sector” (2003) 4:
<www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/26/2496757.pdf > 20 December 2005.
14 IMO leaflet on Preventing Marine Pollution (March 1998): <www. imo.org> 20 July 2005.
15 Such like accidents include the sinking of the nuclear submarine K-141 Kursk in the
Barents Sea in 2000, and the 1997 incident involving surface vessel MSC Carla carrying
packages containing radioactive matter; see the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), “Inventory of accidents and losses at sea involving radioactive material” (2001,
Vienna), IAEA - TECDOC - 1242.
16 2004 International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and
Sediments [Ballast Water Convention], IMO document(s): Final Act_BWM/CONF/37
(not in force), art. 1(2) defines ballast water as “…water with its suspended matter taken
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from ships, and the harmful characteristics of certain substances used as anti-
-fouling systems for ships hulls.17 It is also important to note that the dumping
of waste at sea18 and atmospheric pollution19 fall outside the notion of vessel-
sourced pollution and will not therefore be examined here.20 Pollution by ships
must also be distinguished from marine pollution caused by seabed activities
and land-based sources. Still, where an incident is such that it was caused by a
vessel that was not engaged in the ‘activities in the Area’ as defined in UNCLOS,
in particular that of exploration and exploitation of the seabed and the sub-
soil, such incidents are taken into account.
2. THE SOUTHERN OCEAN
2.1. Searching for an Ocean
In 2000, the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) delimited as
the world’s fifth ocean a vast body of water encircling Antarctica, and linking
the Indian, Atlantic and Pacific Oceans - the Southern Ocean.21 The IHO defines
on board a ship to control trim, list, draught, stability or stresses of the ship”; id, art.
1(11): “[s]ediments means matter settled out of ballast water within a ship.”
17 2001 International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems [Anti -fouling
Convention] IMO Doc. Final Act_AFS/CONF 25 and Resolutions 1,2,3,4 (E/F/S);
Convention AFS/CONF/26 (E/F/S) (not in force), art. 2 (2) establishes a set of rules for
reducing or eliminating adverse effects on the marine environment caused by “a coating,
paint, surface treatment, surface, or device that is used on a ship to control or prevent
attachment of unwanted organisms.”
18 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter
[London Dumping Convention] 1046 UNTS 120 (in force 30 August 1975); Protocol of
1996 to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter, (1997) 36 ILM 1 (not in force).
19 MARPOL, 1996 Annex VI - Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships (in force 19 May 2005);
see IMO, Marine Pollution Conventions: <www.imo.org/InfoResource/mainframe.asp?
topic_id=830> 1 July 2005. No international treaty specifically relates to the preven-
tion of air pollution from ships.
20 See R R Churchill and A V Lowe The Law of the Sea (3rd ed, 1999) 379 -392; IMO, Annex
VI of MARPOL 73/78: Regulations for the Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships and NOx
Technical Code (1998, IMO Publication).
21 IHO Special Publication S-23 (2000), chp. 10.
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the Southern Ocean as the body of water falling below the 600S.22 It is, how-
ever, argued that the Southern Ocean in fact extends beyond 600S, as far north
as the Antarctic Convergence - a divide between the cold Antarctic waters and
the warmer more northerly waters. Therefore, while its ‘southern’ boundary is
taken to be the coast of the Antarctic continent, the outer limits of the Southern
Ocean follow the line of the Antarctic Convergence, customarily referred to as
“the biographic boundary that separates the Antarctic environment from that
of the rest of the world.”23 Given that the Antarctic Convergence is an
intrinsically unsettled natural occurrence, the northern boundaries of the
Southern Ocean are understood to follow the coordinates of the Antarctic
Convergence set in the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine
Living Resources [CCAMLR].
This is however a scientific understanding, and though it may well be the
geographically and ecologically correct one, the Southern Ocean is presently
administratively and politically divided into two regions:
1. Southern Ocean south of 600S (Antarctic region); and
2. Southern Ocean north of 600S as far as the Antarctic Convergence (sub-
-Antarctic region).
The 600S, a political boundary, denotes the scope of application of the
Antarctic Treaty - the founding agreement of the regional regime for
environmental governance of the Southern Ocean - the ATS.24  Currently, three
international legal regimes overlap and interact in the Southern Ocean:
1. Antarctic Treaty System as the regional source of law;
2. General international law; and
3. Domestic laws of the Antarctic and the sub-Antarctic claimant States.
Though the present partition of the Southern Ocean at 60˚S cannot be
ignored, the inter-dependence of the sub-Antarctic and the Antarctic and their
22 Ibid.
23 Antarctic convergence is in average positioned at 58_S, and south of that boundary “lives
the specific Antarctic biota”; see The World Bank, The World Conservation Union (IUCN),
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority A Global Representative System of Marine Protected
Areas: Antarctic, Arctic, Mediterranean, Northwest Atlantic, Northeast Atlantic and Baltic (Vol.
1, 1995) 45- 49.
24 The term ATS was introduced for the first time in 1973 by Roberto Guyer, an Argentine
scholar and diplomat.
Ivana Zovko: Effectivenes of International Instruments of Liability and Compensation for Vessel-Sourced...1150
ecological homogeneity, call for uniform environmental regulation of the ma-
rine area extending as far north as the Antarctic Convergence.
The CCAMLR boundary more closely aligns with the Antarctic ecosystem
than other Antarctic agreements, an aspect that is particularly important to
conservation considerations.25
2.2. The Problem of Vessel-Sourced Pollution
The Southern Ocean has become particularly prone to seaborne pollution
in the past 15 years following the boom in the polar tourism industry26 and
the growing number of substandard illegal fishing vessels in the region.27 A
notable number of these fishing and tourism vessels are registered with FOC
countries28 or ‘unknown’ flag States.29 On the other hand, the danger from
marine spills in the Southern Ocean does not come from their frequency, but
from the severity of the potential impact on the polar marine environment.30
Given the unpredictable weather conditions and the sensitivity of its physical
environment, pollution in the Southern Ocean, including by noise originating
25 A Global Representative System of Marine Protected Areas, above n 42 at 45.
26 In the 2004/2005 season 22,297 passengers landed in the Antarctic on commercially
organized tour and sailing vessels, excluding sailing vessels and yachts operated by non-
IAATO members. This is a 300 percent increase in comparison to the 1992/93 season
(6704 passengers); see International Association of Antarctic Tour Operators (IAATO),
“Overview of Antarctic Tourism - 2004-2005 Antarctic Season,” doc. XXVIII/IP 82 (2005).
27 The problem of Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing is widespread in the
Southern Ocean and the Australian Antarctic Division (AAD) approximates that “[t]he
total IUU catch of toothfish over the past six years is almost equal to the total catch by
legal fishers (80,960 tons and 83,696 tons respectively)”: <www.aad.gov.au/
default.asp?casid=11981> 12 July 2005.
28 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) projects that the number of
fishing vessels on open registers continues to increase; see Lloyd’s Maritime Information
Services 1997 and Lloyd’s Register - Fairplay Ltd. “World Fleet Statistics 2001” reproduced
in the FAO, “State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2002,” at FAO: <www.fao.org> 1
January 2005.
29 See “The Status of the Fishing Fleet in FAO” in FAO, “The State of World Fisheries and
Agriculture” (2004, Rome).
30 COMNAP, “‘Worst Case’ & ‘Less than Worst Case’ Environmental Scenarios,” doc. XXV
ATCM/WP25 (2002) 19.
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from ships,31 could cause greater harmful effects than expected. Detection of
environmental damage and the polluters is made difficult by the vastness of
this region and the polar conditions that only allow for clean-up and rescue
actions during the brief Southern Hemisphere summer season (November -
March).
The most serious pollution incident to date occurred in the Southern Ocean
in 1989 following the sinking of the Argentinean supply and tourist vessel
Bahia Paraiso which spilled some 830,000 litres of diesel fuel and lubricants.32
Many other tourist and fishing vessels have found themselves in distress in the
Southern Ocean due to rough seas, pack ice, icebergs or mechanical
malfunctioning, but there are records of only a few having released pollutants.33
Data concerning fishing vessels is particularly questionable given the extent of
illegal fishing vessels operating in this region. There was only one reported
incident involving pollution from a fishing vessel, the sinking of the longliner
Sudur Havid in June 1998.34 However, one must only consider the various
categories of material entering the marine environment from fishing vessels to
realize the potential harm to marine wildlife that may be caused by them.35
Tourism and scientific research are the two human activities that are most
likely to lead to marine pollution involving ships in this region.
31 See Report by Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) “Marine Acoustic Tech-
nology and the Antarctic Environment”: <www.cep.aq/MediaLibrary/asset/MediaItems/
ml_377774981018519_IP%20xx%204c%20ASOC%20marine%20acoustics%200522
final.doc> 2 July 2005.
32 P A Penhale, J  Coosen, and E R Marschoff “The Bahia Paraiso: A case study in
environmental impact, remediation and monitoring” in B Battaglia, J Valencia and D W
H Walton (eds.) Antarctic Communities, Species, Structure and Survival (1997) 437-444.
33 Incidents involving sinking vessels south of 60(S: Gotland II (1981); Southern Quest (1986);
Nella Dan (1987); Bahia Paraiso (1989); see COMNAP Report 2002, above n 30.
34 K-H Kock  “The direct influence of fishing and fishery-related activities on non-target
species in the Southern Ocean with particular emphasis on longline fishing and its impact
on albatrosses and petrels - a review” (2001) 11 Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries 31, 34.
35 Id at 35-38 suggests that such material includes for example: beach litter and floating
marine debris; ingestion of and entanglement in plastic material; plastic package bands
from bait boxes and fishing nets; the impact of bottom trawling on benthic communities.
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3. SETTING THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
REMEDYING VESSEL-SOURCED POLLUTION
The international law of marine pollution can be found in all the sources of
international environmental law:36
1. Legally binding instruments:37
a. Treaty law;
b. International customary law;
c. General principles of international law;
d. Judicial decisions;
e. Writings of eminent publicists.
3. International soft law.
This paper solely considers international agreements of both ‘soft-law’ nature
as non-legally binding principles and standards, as well as instruments of ‘hard
law’ nature that constitute legally binding norms. Apart from global inter-
national law, regional instruments for environmental governance of the Southern
Ocean, in particular the Antarctic Treaty,38 and the 1991 Protocol on Environmental
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty [Environmental Protocol],39 are also considered.
3.1. Framework Treaties
The two milestone multilateral agreements specifically concerning
environmental law of the oceans and seas are MARPOL and UNCLOS.
MARPOL is an example of an MMEA that has advanced beyond a compendium
of rules and regulations into an international environmental regime (IER) viewed
by Young and Levy as the “social institutions consisting of agreed upon
principles, norms, rules, procedures, and programs that govern the interactions
of actors in specific issue areas.”40 Neither  MARPOL or UNCLOS provide
36 For sources of international environmental law, see P Sands Principles of International En-
vironmental Law (2nd ed, 2003) 123 - 268.
37 ICJ Statute, art. 38 (1).
38 402 UNTS 71 (in force 23 June 1961).
39 (1998) ATS No 6 (in force 14 January 1998).
40 O R Young and M A Levy “The effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes” in
O R Young (ed) Effectiveness of International Environmental regimes: causal connections and
behavioural  mechanisms’(1999) 1.
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remedies for ship-sourced pollution damage, save through the concept of state
responsibility, which will not be subject to analysis in this paper.
3.2. Global Agreements
3.2.1. Pollution by Oil
The 1992 Liability41 and the 1992 Fund Convention,42 establish a compre-
hensive multi-tiered reparation regime regarding loss or damage pursuant to
discharge or escape of oil from laden and non-laden tankers, including spills of
bunker oil from such ships.43 The Bunkers Convention44 applies to pollution
incidents resulting from the escape or discharge of bunker oil from non-tank-
ers, without prejudice to bunkers of tankers since these are covered under the
1992 Liability and Fund Conventions.45
Apart from the abovementioned treaties, a number of other international agree-
ments and supplementary legal instruments have been negotiated regarding tanker
oil pollution. None of these establish liability and compensation regimes:
• 1969 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases
of Oil Pollution Casualties [1969 Intervention Convention];46
• 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-
-operation [OPRC 1990];47 and
• Annex I to MARPOL.48
41 Above n 3.
42 Above n 4; see also I Dramé “Recovering Damage to the Environment per se following an
Oil Spill: the Shadows and Lights of the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions of 1992”
(2005) 14 (1) RECIEL 63.
43 1992 Liability Convention, art. 1(5): “[o]il means any persistent hydrocarbon mineral
oil such as crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil, lubricating oil, whether carried on board a
ship as cargo or in the bunkers of such a ship”; see also 1992 Fund Convention, art. 1(2);
on the definition of a ship, see 1992 Liability Convention, art. 1(1); 1992 Fund
Convention, art. 1(2).
44 Above n 5.
45 Bunkers Convention, art. 4(a).
46 970 UNTS 211 (in force 6 May 1975), as amended by the Protocol of 1973.
47 [1995] ATS No 12 (in force 13 May 1995).
48 MARPOL, 1973 Annex I - Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Oil (came into force
with MARPOL 73/78 on 2 October 1983),
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3.2.2. Pollution by Hazardous Substances
3.2.2.1. Hazardous Noxious Substances
Several legal instruments regulate pollution in connection with the carriage
of hazardous noxious substances (HNS):
• HNS Convention;49
• 2000 Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to Pollution Incidents
by Hazardous and Noxious Substances [OPRC-HNS Protocol];50
• Annex II to MARPOL;51
• Annex III to MARPOL;52 and
• 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea [SOLAS].53
From the above instruments, only the HNS Convention establishes a liability
and compensation regime.
3.2.2.2. Hazardous Waste
The 1999 Basel Liability Protocol54 to the 1989 Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal
[Basel Convention]55 establishes a comprehensive regime of liability and re-
dress concerning:
damage resulting from the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes
and other wastes and their disposal including illegal traffic of those wastes.56
49 Above n 5.
50 IMO Doc. HNS-OPRC/CONF/11/Rev 1 of 15 March 2000 (not in force).
51 MARPOL, 1973 Annex II - Regulations for the Control of Pollution by Noxious Liquid Substances
in bulk (in force 6 April 1987)
52 MARPOL, 1978 Annex III - Prevention of Pollution by Harmful Substances Carried by Sea in
Packaged Form (in force 1 July 1992).
53 1355 UNTS 341 (in force on 25 May 1980), Chapter VII- carriage of dangerous goods.
54 Above n 5.
55 1673 UNTS 57 (in force 5 May 1992).
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3.2.2.3. Marine Pollution by Radioactive Matter
There are two types of nuclear incidents involving radioactive substances at
sea, governed under two separate regimes, in particular:
• Pollution by a ship operated by means of nuclear power (nuclear ships); and
• Pollution during carriage of radioactive substances.
Pollution by nuclear ships is effectively left unregulated given that the sole
instrument governing such incidents is the 1962 Nuclear Ships Convention57
that has never come into force. On the one hand, nuclear incident occurring
during transboundary transport of radioactive substances is extensively regulated
under domestic law, and a number of treaties and other soft law international
instruments. Two international regimes can be identified. The first regime
collectively referred to as the Paris regime, is regionally linked to European
countries, and it comprises the 1960 Convention on Third Party Liability in the
Field of Nuclear Energy [1960 Paris Convention],58 as amended by the 1964,
1982 and 2004 Protocols,59 and supplemented by the 1963 Supplementary
Convention.60 The second regime, the Vienna regime, rests on the 1963 Convention
on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage [1963 Vienna Convention]61 as amended
by the 1997 Protocol.62 Neither the Paris nor the Vienna Convention engage a
56 Basel Liability Protocol, art. 1. The Protocol adopts the terminology and the general
scope of application from the Basel Convention as its supplementary mechanism; see
Basel Liability Protocol, art. 2(1); Basel Convention, art. 2(10).
57 Above n 5.
58 956 UNTS 251 (in force 1 April 1968) as amended by Additional Protocol of 28 January
1964, and Protocol of  1982.
59 Protocol to Amend the Convention on Third Party Liability in The Field of Nuclear Energy of 29
July 1960, as amended by the additional Protocol of 28 January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16
November 1982, at Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA): <www.nea.fr/html/law/paris_convention.pdf>
1 July 2005.
60 Supplementary Convention to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in
the Field of Nuclear Energy [1963 Brussels Convention] 1041 UNTS 358, (in force 4
December 1974).
61 1063 UNTS 265 (in force 12 November 1977).
62 (1997) 36 ILM 1454 (in force 4 October 2003)[ the 1963 Vienna Convention as amended
by the 1997 Protocol, hereinafter ‘1997 Vienna Convention’]; full text of the 1997 Vienna
Convention in 1997 Protocol, Annex, at: <.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/
protamend_annex.html#Anchor-1>20 January 2006.
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significant number of States, 15 and 33 respectively.63 The Conventions were
joined into one liability regime by the 1988 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application
of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention [1988 Joint Protocol], that
enables interchangeable application of the two instruments among State parties
to either of them.64 Still, these two conventions in reality represent two sepa-
rate mechanisms, evident from the dissimilarities between the latest 2004 Pro-
tocol to the Paris Convention, and the 1997 Protocol to the Vienna Conven-
tion. Another treaty to consider in the context of seaborne carriage of nuclear
material is the 1971 Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime
Carriage of Nuclear Material [Nuclear Convention].65 This Convention is also
intended to resolve potential conflicts in the application of the 1963 Vienna
and the 1960 Paris Conventions, and any other international instrument that
regulates the same subject-matter. One must add to this list the 1997 Conven-
tion on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage [1997 Supplementary
Convention],66 that offers a unified nuclear liability system open to all States,
not solely contracting parties to the 1963 Paris and the 1997 Vienna Conven-
tions.
3.2.3. Pollution by All Other Substances
Pollution by garbage and discharge of sewage from ships is regulated under
Annexes IV and V to MARPOL, respectively.67 Neither of these two Annexes
contains provisions on liability and compensation whatsoever. Similarly, the
Ballast Water Convention68 and the Anti-fouling Convention69 solely focus on
63 For the latest status of ratifications,
see: < http://www.nea.fr/html/law/paris-convention-ratification.html> 1 June 2005;
< http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/liability_status.pdf> 1 June 2005.
64 1672 UNTS 293 (in force 27 April 1992).
65 974 UNTS 255 (in force 15 July 1975).
66 (1997) 36 ILM 1473 (not in force).
67 MARPOL, 1978 Annex IV - Prevention of Pollution by Sewage from Ships (in force 27 September
2003); MARPOL, 1978 Annex V - Prevention of Pollution by Garbage from Ships (in force 31
December 1988).
68 Above n 16.
69 Above n 17.
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the complex technical aspects of pollution prevention and regulation, while
completely omitting rules on liability and compensation. Both conventions
are yet to come into force.  Another important maritime liability treaty is the
1976 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims [LLMC] and its
1996 Protocol.70 The Convention establishes uniform rules on limitation of
liability for maritime claims as a general category, thus possibly including claims
for environmental damage pursuant to vessel-sourced pollution.
3.2.4. The International Law Commission’s Project on International Liability
In 2004 the International Law Commission (ILC) adopted after over 26
years of negotiations the Draft Principles on the allocation of loss in the case of
transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities.71 These Principles are the
second and the final stage of the ILC’s project on “International  liability for
injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law”
that was placed on its agenda in 1978. In 1992 this project was divided into
two segments - prevention and international liability, with the first phase
finalised in 2001 with the adoption of the 2001 Draft Articles on the Prevention
of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities.72 The 2001 ILC’s Draft Articles
solely define and impose obligations on States with regard to prevention of
transboundary harm, whereas the topic of international liability went on to
undergo extensive structural metamorphosis for another three years before
being completed in 2004 in the form of the Draft Principles.
As a soft law agreement general and residual in nature, the 2004 ILC’s
Draft Principles represent a (d)evolution from the previous proposals that sought
to establish a comprehensive liability and compensation mechanism. These
Principles are solely meant to provide appropriate guidance to States in re-
70 1456 UNTS 221 (in force 1 December 1986); Protocol of 1996 to amend the Convention on
Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976 [LLMC PROT 1996] (1996) 35 ILM
1433 (not in force).
71 Hereinafter ‘2004 ILC’s Draft Principles’, in Report of the ILC on the work of its 56th
session, UN GAOR sess. 59, Supplement No. 10 (A/59/10) (2004), chp. VII, 159.
[hereinafter ‘2004 ILC’s Report’].
72 Hereinafter ‘2001 ILC’s Draft Articles on Prevention’ Report of the ILC on the work of
its 53rd sess, UN GAOR, 56th session, Supplement No 10 (A/56/10), chp. V.E.1.
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spect of hazardous activities not covered by specific agreements, and to indi-
cate matters that should be dealt with in such agreements.73 Consequently,
they did not echo noticeably with the scholars or the international legal com-
munity.
3.3. Regional Agreements
A comprehensive set of regional environmental rules and regulations tailored
to the Antarctic continent and the Southern Ocean south of 60(S, was developed
in 1991 in the form of Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty.74 Annexes
I,75 III,76 and IV77 to this Protocol specifically regulate vessel-sourced pollution.
While the Protocol itself does not contain provisions on liability and compen-
sation in relation to environmental damage, Article 16 of the Protocol explicitly
calls for the establishment of an environmental liability regime. Following 13
years of negotiations, Annex VI to the Environmental Protocol [Environmental
Protocol Annex VI]78 dealing with liability and compensation for environmental
harm south of 600S was negotiated. Environmental Protocol Annex VI is of
limited scope, as it effectively only establishes a system concerning response
actions performed in case of environmental emergencies taking place in the
Antarctic Treaty Area (ATA), hence south of 600S, therefore excluding the sub-
-Antarctic sections of the Southern Ocean.
4. SEARCHING FOR EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
In its first segment, the discussion on effectiveness considers the justifiability
of the various concepts and instruments of liability and compensation pres-
ently employed in the above nominated international regimes related to ves-
73 2004 ILC’s Report, chp. VII, above n 71 at 158.
74 Above n 39.
75 Environmental Protocol, Annex I - Environmental Impact Assessment.
76 Id, Annex III - Waste Disposal and Waste Management.
77 Id, Annex IV - Prevention of Marine Pollution.
78 Environmental Protocol Annex VI (Liability Arising from Environmental Emergencies),
Measure XXX, doc. XXVIII ATCM/WP69 (2005).
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sel-sourced pollution in the sense of providing prompt and adequate compen-
sation when the same is not otherwise available.79 Secondly, the discussion
considers the role of ‘liability’, and in a wider sense MMEAs, in deterrence of
future incidents, arguing that any such role is at present minor. As the third
evaluation test, the study examines the ‘authority’ of the regimes as per their
enforcement and compliance. When considering that the majority of the
MMEAs do not comprise rules on liability and compensation at all, and only
one comprehensive regime is in force, the test of authority becomes a quest to
discover the rationale for the inertness in the overall international liability law
concerning vessel-sourced pollution. For the purpose of this discussion, com-
pliance is understood as whether States meet their obligations assumed under
MMEAs, while enforcement relates to the implementation of consequences
for non-compliance with the adopted treaty obligations.80 Implementation is
comprised within the notion of enforcement, and it specifically refers to incor-
porating international norms into domestic law through “legislation, judicial
decision, executive decree or other process.”81 One must note that authority of
an international instrument is interlinked with the notion of legitimacy that
Vidas defines as “determining whether and to what extent those addressed by
a rule see themselves as obligated by it.”82 Legitimacy and effectiveness are
considered separate notions.83 Nonetheless, the position assumed for the pur-
79 L Bergkamp  Liability and Environment (2003) 68 - 119 debates the different objectives
that environmental liability aims to achieve: compensation and victim protection;
deterrence; cost and risk spreading; wealth distribution; corrective justice; and justice
and economics.
80 T E Crossen “Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the Compliance Continuum”
(2003) 36 ExpressO Preprint Series, Berkley Electronic Press: <http://law.bepress.com/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1075&context=expresso> 1 October 2005.
81 D Shelton “Introduction” in D Shelton (ed) Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-
binding Norms in the International Legal System (2000) 1, 5.
82 O S Stokke and D Vidas “Effectiveness and legitimacy of international regimes” in O S
Stokke and D Vidas Governing the Antarctic: Effectiveness and Legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty
System  (1996) 13, 20-21.
83 Unlike effectiveness, legitimacy does not focus on the results that the regime achieves in
resolving specific issues, but it is rather concerned with the applicability and acceptance
of an IER’s norms and structure; see id at 26-28; see also M Koskenniemi The Gentle
Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (2001); M Koskenniemi
“Book Review of Thomas Franck’s The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (1992) 86
(1) A J Int’l L 175; T M Franck The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (1990).
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pose of this paper is that success of an MMEA or an IER inevitably draws on
successful enforcement and compliance, which warrants a brief discussion.
Table 1 below is provided for the purpose of offering a comparative over-
view of the key features of the relevant agreements from section 3 of this pa-
per. Table 1 considers whether MMEAs determine any or all of the following:
• Pure environmental damage as compensable;
• Pure environmental damage affecting the high seas marine environment as
compensable;
• Persons liable and the standard of liability imposed on them;
• Financial security: compulsory insurance and/or pollution compensation
fund;
• Conflict of laws rules: court of competent jurisdiction, applicable law, and
guarantee of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments; and
• Provisions on residual State liability.
Table 1 also indicates whether an MMEA is in force or not, the number of
its State parties, and the percentage of the world fleet that it is representative
of.
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4.1. The Goal of Prompt and Adequate Relief
The primary goal of international instruments on liability and compensa-
tion is to ensure that the victims of environmental harm are not left unpro-
tected. This is achieved by: facilitating quicker processing of claims for com-
pensation; reducing forum shopping through unification of relevant interna-
tional rules; and by erasing the costs of the numerous ‘middle men’ such as
lawyers and government officials characteristic of incoherent international le-
gal system. However, it is only in case of the tanker oil pollution regime, that
the victims of environmental harm are in an undisputedly better position than
if no such regime was available. Other regimes that have been developed are
not in force, except for the system of liability for nuclear damage that has been
in force for over three decades, but never resorted to. Despite their present
‘paper back’ existence, certain ambiguities may already be identified in these
regimes that will inevitably impede upon their ability to provide prompt and
adequate relief once they are enforced. The same issues already hinder the
effectiveness of the tanker oil pollution regime. This concerns the restricted
understanding of compensable pure environmental damage that is either com-
pletely overlooked in the treaty law, or restricted to a ‘reasonable’ minimum.
Irreparable environmental harm, and pollution affecting marine areas beyond
national jurisdiction are completely neglected. These regimes also fail in that
they set the liability limits too low and inflexible, and they do not envisage
adequate subsidiary means of compensation so as cover loss beyond the limits
of liability of the primary liable party. Alternative compensation mechanisms
that could be further exploited include: extending the number of persons pri-
mary liable; residual State liability; compensation funds; compulsory insur-
ance; unlimited fault based liability for intentional or reckless behaviour con-
tributing to environmental harm.
4.1.1. Probing the ‘Strict Liability/Fund’ Formula
This section explores the principal weak spots of the international regimes
of liability and compensation that at the same time hold the greatest potential
for increasing supplementary funding for vessel-sourced pollution damage: (a)
defining compensable pure environmental damage; (b) widening or enhancing
polluter’s liability; (c) expanding the list of liable persons; (d) establishing
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pollution compensation funds; (e) strict and fault based liability; (f) limited
and unlimited liability; (g) damages with a punitive character and residual
State liability; and (h) sovereign immunity of public vessels.
a. Defining Pure Environmental Damage
The most suitable understanding of pure environmental damage is found
in the definition of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP):
a measurable adverse impact on the quality of particular environment or
any of its components including its use and non-use values and its ability to
support and sustain an acceptable quality of life and a viable ecological
balance.84
Another example of an extensive approach in defining environmental damage
per se can be found in the 1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral
Resource Activities [CRAMRA]:85
any impact on the living or non-living components of that environment or
those ecosystems, including harm or atmospheric, marine or terrestrial life,
beyond that which is negligible or which has been assessed and judged to be
acceptable pursuant to the convention.
Both of the above definitions are far more extensive than any comprised
within the liability and compensation regimes discussed here. Nonetheless,
both CRAMRA and UNEP employ adjectives of ‘measurable adverse impact’
and ‘beyond negligible’ to ensure that compensation is kept at the manageable
level. The 1992 Liability Convention offers a seemingly wide understanding of
oil-pollution damage as “loss or damage caused by escape or discharge of oil
from the ship, wherever such escape or discharge may occur.”86 However, it
limits the same to the costs of ‘reasonable’ measures of reinstatement undertaken
or to be undertaken.87 The same principle is followed in other international
84 UNEP, “Working Group of Experts on Liability and Compensation for Environmental
Damage Arising from Military Activities” in A Timoshenko (ed) Liability and Compensation
for Environmental Damage, Compilation of Documents (UNEP Publication, 1998) 9.
85 (1988) 27 ILM 868 (not in force).
86 1992 Liability Convention, art. 1(6.a).
87 Id, art. 1(6.b); see comments in R H P Brans Liability for Damage to Public Natural Resources:
Standing, Damage and Damage Assessment (2001) 353-354.
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regimes that offer compensation for pure environmental harm.88 None of these
regimes defines what is implied by ‘reasonable measures’ that act as the
measurement for the level of available compensation.
Some insight as to the logic behind adopting restrictive definitions of pure
environmental damage is exposed in the practical experience of the tanker oil
pollution regime. The International Oil Pollution Compensation (IOPC) Funds
Assembly’s89 1980 Resolution No 3 recognises as compensable solely the
quantifiable losses, while claims based on the use of “abstract quantification of
damage calculated in accordance with theoretical models” are to be rejected.90
Moreover, by asserting that solely measures of reinstatement to be undertaken
or that have been undertaken can be compensated, the IOPC Funds, and other
relevant regimes, predetermine and define the level of compensation by linking
it with particular actions. Among others, measures of reinstatement may also
include costs of post-spill environmental studies that determine the nature
and the extent of environmental damage, as well as those identifying the
conditions of ‘necessity’ and ‘reasonableness’ of reinstatement.
As for the condition of ‘reasonableness’, neither the 1992 Liability or the
1992 Fund Conventions, or any other relevant regime, deliberate on the
condition of reasonableness. However, the 1971 and the 1992 Fund Claims
Manuals,91 two explanatory booklets that illustrate the process of bringing
claims for compensation against the 1971 and 1992 IOPC Funds, offer an
interpretation of ‘reasonableness’. Specifically, the 1992 Claims Manual asserts:
88 1992 Fund Convention, art. 1(2); 2001 Bunkers Convention, art. 1(a,b); HNS Conven-
tion, arts. 1(6c,d), 2(2.c(iv,v)); Basel Liability Protocol, art. 2(c(iv,v), d, e); 1997 Vienna
Convention, art. 1(1.k (4,6), m, n).
89 The IOPC Funds 1971 and 1992 are two separate intergovernmental organizations
administering and enforcing the 1971 Fund and 1992 Fund Conventions, and their
subsequent Amendments and Protocols.
90 FUND/A/ES 1/13 (10 October 1980), para. 2 (1), and Annex I; similar was argued by the
1971 IOPC Fund in the General Nation Maritime Transport Co. v Patmos Shipping Co.,[The
Patmos Claim] Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Messina, Judgments (30 March 1989
and 24 December 1993) in Fund/EXC.16/8,220 (October 1986); see I Dramé “Recovering
Damage to the Environment per se following an Oil Spill: the Shadows and Lights of the
Civil Liability and Fund Conventions of 1992” (2005) 14 (1) RECIEL 63, 66-68.
91 For the full text of the 1992 and the 1971 Fund Claims Manuals, see: < www.iopcfund.org/
publications.htm> 20 June 2005.
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“[t]he aim of any reasonable measures of reinstatement should be to re-
establish a biological community in which the organisms characteristic of
that community at the time of the incident are present and are functioning
normally.”92
This Manual determines that unquantifiable damage will not be compen-
sated.93 Here one must note that irreparable damage is not compensable whether
as unquantifiable, i.e. because the components of the environment cannot be
reinstated, or as unreasonable because the overall costs of reinstatement, or
damage cannot be evaluated. Dramé warns that “[this] inevitably implies that
the prospect for compensation decreases as damage to the environment increases
in size and severity,” placing:
the polluter who causes environmental damage of an irreparable nature ..in
a more favourable situation than the one responsible for less serious damage
but ‘reinstatable” at reasonable cost.94
What is disconcerting is that industry organizations such as the ITOPF
continue arguing the ‘self-healing capabilities of the marine environment,’ and
the supposed detrimental effects of the human involvement.95 Since the industry
still has a deciding word in the formulation of MMEAs, pure environmental
damage caused by ships is not likely to be made compensable in the adequate
scope in an international instrument. Progression is solely possible through
‘creative’ interpretation of the condition of ‘reasonableness’ by domestic courts
deciding cases that fall under the relevant international regimes.
b. Liability Limits and Insurance
Liability is regularly employed in international marine environmental law
in its simplified form - limited, strict, and attributable to the shipowner or the
operator. Here, one must note that the concept of liability considered is civil
liability.96 Attributing strict liability to the shipowner/operator regardless of
92 1992 Fund Claims Manual, id at 32.
93  Id at 21-24, 31-34.
94 Dramé, above n 90 at 64.
95 Id at 70.
96 Criminal and administrative liability have not been the subject of this thesis; for a detailed
analysis of the concept of civil liability see J L Coleman Risk and Wrongs, Cambridge Studies
in Philosophy and the Law (1992); P Cane The Anatomy of Tort Law (1997); C De la Rue
Liability for Damage to the Marine Environment (1993).
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fault is welcomed as it allows for a relaxed burden of proof for the claimant,
thereby ensuring that victims are ultimately compensated. Namely, the claimants
must only prove that the damage suffered was caused by a vessel, without
having to identify a particular one, in order for their claims to be admissible.
However, limiting strict liability to an inadequate sum significantly diminishes
its relevance in the covering of loss. Most treaties envisage limits of liability,
and establish their own tables of limitation, apart from the Bunkers Convention.
In addition, Griggs argues that imposing limits on liability and compensation
in fixed amounts diminishes the effectiveness of an international instrument
since by the time it comes into force, the set limits lose their value.97
 States are pressured by various interest groups in international shipping
such as shipowners, operators, oil industry, insurers, and other States to maintain
the present system of limited strict liability. Various arguments are put forth by
different lobby groups against expanding polluter’s liability, and liability for
pure environmental damage. The central argument reiterates the presumptions
of restricted capacity of the insurance market and the shipowner/operator being
already financially over-burdened under the existing regimes. It is further
contended that liability limits should not be set above the maximum insurable
liability, given that this would leave the shipowners and other potentially liable
parties financially exposed, thus disrupting their legitimate businesses. In
addition, the insurers and reinsurers accentuate that the profitability of their
underwriting policies is threatened by the growing trend of expanding of strict
liability, and indemnifications for non-pecuniary damage such as punitive
damages, or damage to natural resources.98 Even if one is to accept the argument
of limited insurance market capacity, the present liability limits are set well
below the reasonable maximum. What is more, there is much that questions
the presumption of the restricted capacity of the Protection and Indemnity
(P&I) Clubs, in particular insurance club pooling.99 One of the reasons for this
97 P J S Griggs “Obstacles to Uniformity of Maritime Law: The Nicholas J. Healy Lecture”
(2003) 34 Mar. L. & Com. 191, 202; Griggs, ibid in response to this problem, as well as so
as to accommodate the different perception of the limits by the developed north and
developing south, suggests including a range of limitation figures in conventions that
would function under the “opt out clause.”
98 J Brewer “Reinsurers delve into growing exposures” Lloyd’s List ( Company News) (6
October 2005).
99 Insurance pool is an organization of insurers or reinsurers through which particular types
of risks are written with the premiums, losses, and expenses shared in agreed amounts
among the insurers belonging to the pool.
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is that environmental damage risk coverage is still insufficiently developed and
lethargic.100 For instance, the McKenna Report suggests that the majority of
insurance policies available in the EU market are limited to sudden and
accidental damage, and predominately solely concerning highly hazardous and
risk carrying activities.101 Particular limitations refer to compensation for damage
to the natural resources, which is commonly unrecoverable. This is not surprising
bearing in mind that damage to the natural resources is not compensable under
the tanker oil pollution regime, or the Bunkers Convention. Furthermore, RøsΩg
from the Scandinavian Institute of Maritime Law maintains that the legislators
of the IMO Conventions on liability have been influenced too much by the
insurance practices in excepting the limited capacity argument.102 RøsΩg holds
that the insurance market, in particular the P&I clubs would generally
strengthen by increases of liability and insurance, hence such increases are
possible. Still, the ‘limited capacity’ myth is best evidenced when comparing
insurance covers available for different types of marine pollution damage. For
instance, the maximum level of liability for the operator in case of damage by
oil when carried as cargo goes up to 89 million 770 thousand SDR, while the
shipowner under the HNS regime may limit its liability to the maximum of
100 million SDR. This bar is further raised in the 2004 Protocols to the 1960
Paris Convention and the 1997 Supplementary Convention, reaching 617
million SDR (€700 million).
100  ERM Economics, London “Economic aspects of liability and joint compensation sys-
tems for remedying environmental damage - summary report” (1996), reproduced in
European Commission (EC) White paper on environmental liability (9 February 2000) COM
(2000) 66 final, 37, 41 - 43.
101 McKenna & Co, London, “Study of civil liability systems for remedying environmental
damage - executive summary,” June 1996, (EC Report D-G XI; 1996).
102 E R_sÊg “The impact of insurance practices on liability conventions,” published in Legislative
Approaches in Maritime Law: Proceedings from the European Colloquium on Maritime Law (Lysebu,
Oslo, 7-8 December 2000) MalrIus No 283, Scandinavian Institute of Maritime Law:
<www.jus.uio.no/nifs/> 1 July 2005.
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Table 2103 Comparative overview of compensation limits in global and regional treaty law
COMPENSATION LIMITS AVAILABLE UNDER THE 1992 LIABILITY AND FUND
CONVENTIONS
Liable Entity Ships Tonnage Compensation
SHIPOWNER’S Ship <5 000 gt 4 510 000 SDR (US$ 6.58 million)
LIABILITY
Ships:  5 001 - 139 000 gt +  631 SDR (US$ 921) for each
additional unit of tonnage
Ships:  140 000 gt or over 89 770 000 SDR  (US$ 131 million)
1992 IOPC FUND
(including maximum payable by shipowner) 203 million SDR (US$ 296 million)
SUPPLEMENTARY FUND Additional  547 million SDR
(only for incidents after 3 March 2005) (US$ 798.5 million)
MAXIMUM  PER INCIDENT 750 million SDR
(US$ 1 billion 94 million)
LIMITS OF LIABILITY OF THE SHIPOWNERS AND SALVORS UNDER THE 1976
LLMC
Liable Entity Ships Tonnage Compensation
≤ 5000 gt 500,000 SDR (US$ 729,920)
Between 501 -  3,000 gt + 667 SDR (US$ 973) for each
additional unit of tonnage
Between 3,001 -  30,000 gt + 467 SDR  (US$ 681) for each
additional unit of tonnage
Between + 375 SDR  (US$ 547) for each
30,001 -  70,000 gt additional unit of tonnage
≥ 70,000 gt + 250 SDR  (US$ 365) for each
additional unit of tonnage
103 The employed conversion rates SDR -US$, and Euro - US$ for this table are as deter-
mined by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on 15 June 2005: 1 SDR = 1.45984
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LIMITS OF LIABILITY OF THE SHIPOWNERS AND SALVORS UNDER THE 1996
PROTOCOL  TO THE LLMC
Compensable loss Ships Tonnage Compensation
≤ 2,000 gt 2 million SDR (US$ 2.9  million).
Between 2,001 - 30,000 gt + 800 SDR (US$ 1167) for each
additional unit of tonnage
Between 30,001 - 70,000 gt + 600 SDR (US$ 876) for each
additional unit of tonnage
> 70,000 gt + 400 SDR  (US$ 584) for each
additional unit of tonnage
≥ 2,000 gt 1 million SDR (US$ 1.45 million).
Between 2,001 - 30,000 gt + 400 SDR (US$ 584) for each
additional unit of tonnage
Between 30,001 - 70,000 gt + 300 SDR (US$ 438) for each
additional unit of tonnage
> 70,000 gt + 200 SDR (US$ 292) for each
additional unit of tonnage
FINANCIAL LIMITS FOR LIABILITY UNDER THE 1999 BASEL LIABILITY
PROTOCOL
Liable Entity Units of shipment (Tonnes) Unit of account (SDR)
≤ 5 Minimum 1 million SDR
(US$ 1.45 million)
≤ 25 Minimum 2 million SDR
(US$ 2.91 million)
≤ 50 Minimum 4 million SDR
(US$ 5.84 million)
≤ 1000 Minimum 6 million SDR
(US$ 8.76 million)
≤ 10.000 Minimum 10 million SDR
(US$ 14.5 million)
> 10 000 10 million SDR + 1000 SDR
(US$ 1459) for each additional ton
Maximum  per incident 30 million SDR (US$ 43.79 million)
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COMPENSATION LIMITS UNDER THE 1996 HNS REGIME
Liable Entity Ships Tonnage Compensation
≤ 2000 gt 10 million SDR (US$ 14.5 million)
Between 2,001 - 50,000 gt + 1 500 SDR (US$ 2189) per each
addition unit of tonnage
> 50,000 gt + 360 SDR (US$ 525.5)  for each
additional unit of tonnage
MAXIMUM per incident 100 million SDR (US$ 145 million)
250 million SDR ( ~US$ 365 million)
THE 2004 PROTOCOLS TO AMEND THE 1960 PARIS CONVENTION
ON NUCLEAR THIRD PARTY LIABILITY AND THE 1963 BRUSSELS
SUPPLEMENTARY CONVENTION
OPERATOR
(NUCLEAR INSTALLATION) Up to € 700 million (US$ 844.8  million) per incident
PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE
INSTALLATION STATE Up to € 500 million (US$ 603.5  million) per incident
PUBLIC FUNDS BY ALL
CONTRACTING PARTIES Up to € 300 million (US$ 362 million) per incident
MAXIMUM € 1.5 billion ($US 1.81 billion) per incident
2005 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTOCOL ANNEX VI
OPERATOR’S LIABILITY
Ships tonnage (gt) Compensation
Ships < 2000  1 million SDR (US$ 1.45 million)
Ships: 2001-30 000 + 400 SDR (US$ 584) per each
addition unit of tonnage
Ships: 30 001- 70 000 + 300 SDR (US$ 434) for each
additional unit of tonnage
Ships: 70 000 + + 200 SDR  (US$ 294) for each
additional unit of tonnage
Incidents other than ships 3 million SDR (US$ 4.37 million)
All  incidents when environmental emergency is caused by negligence
or intent of the operator
FUND
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In light of the above, it is clear that the reluctance of the P&I clubs to see
the level of shipowner’s liability increase, is not driven by the restrictions dictated
by market demands, but the fear of stagnating profit. For example, it would
not be profitable enough to offer higher cover for less hazardous type of activities,
that are also more frequently performed, and hence the cover is more likely to
be activated. Moreover, the insurance companies are well protected under the
international environmental liability regimes since in cases of direct action
against them, the insurers may rely upon any defences available to the shipowner
to have a particular claim dismissed. They may also avoid liability for otherwise
admissible claims if it is established that the damage resulted from the wilful
misconduct of the shipowner.104 The reality is that the insurance pools do have
the right to protect their business interests, and are powerful enough to sabotage
any proposals for increased level of liability for pollution damage. Similar to
the insurance clubs, the shipowners and operators continuously emphasise
that any further raising of the liability cap would put them out of business.
The power of the insurance and the shipowners lobby groups was once again
evidenced in October 2005 when the possibility for raising the liability limits
under the 1992 Liability Convention was discussed. The proposal to increase
the limits was defeated , and an alternative option proposed by Greece with
the support of INTERTANCO was adopted. The Greek proposal envisages
increasing shipowners’ share of the costs of compensation for oil pollution
damage through extension of the Small Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnification
Agreement (STOPIA),105 an industry instrument put forth by the P&I clubs.
Unlike the raising the liability limits, a more prospective measure for ensuring
the availability of funds for compensation is the mechanism of compulsory
insurance. Compulsory insurance is imposed upon the shipowner/operator.106
It circumvents the difficulties of ‘piercing the corporate veil,’ the possibility of
filing for bankruptcy, or other methods of evading payment of compensation
since the funds must be made available through insurance before the voyage.
Compulsory insurance is also a means of ensuring enforcement of pollution
104 P Griggs “International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage,
2001” (2001) II Il Diritto Marittimo 859-867.
105 “Oil spill Payout pact welcomed” Lloyd’s List (Company News) (24 October 2004).
106 2001 Bunkers Convention, art. 7; 1992 Liability Convention, art. 7; HNS Convention,
art. 12; Basel Liability Protocol, art. 14; 1960 Paris Convention, art. 10; 1997 Vienna
Convention, art. VII.
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prevention regulations. Namely, it is in the best interest of the shipowner/
operator to comply with the set standards of pollution prevention, given that
the P&I clubs assess the ‘record’ of its past covers before issuing a new policy.
The IMO has recognised the importance of compulsory insurance, and the
need to extend it to all shipowners in the IMO Guidelines on Shipowners’
Responsibilities in respect of Maritime Claims.107 However, the level of compulsory
insurance cover is dependent on the restrictive policy of the P&I clubs.
Therefore, while it makes compensation readily available, compulsory insurance
does not help increase its level.
 Ultimately, it is not to be expected that the necessary funds for covering
loss resulting from marine environmental damage will be secured by stretching
the liability limits, and the compulsory insurance to the necessary level. It is
for this very reason that the second tier, independent of insurance and liability,
has been added to the international maritime liability regimes.108
c. Pollution Compensation Funds
An alternative or a supplement to the mechanism of liability for environ-
mental damage can be found in purely financial schemes for the covering of
loss from environmental harm - the so-called pollution compensation funds.109
The two principle objectives of a pollution compensation fund are: (a) providing
primary and additional monetary resources for ensuring prompt, adequate and
effective compensation; as well as (b) realising the principle of fairness in terms
of equitable sharing of the risk of pollution damage between carriers110 and
cargo owners. In case of the nuclear incidents, the said risk sharing occurs
107 IMO Guidelines were adopted in the form of a Resolution by the IMO 21st Assembly,
Resolution A. 898 (21) (25 November 1999): <http://folk.uio.no/erikro/WWW/corrgr/
insurance/898.pdf > 1 May 2005.
108 See M Faure and W Hui “The international regimes for the compensation of oil-pollution
damage: Are they effective?” (2003) 12(3) RECIEL 242-253.
109 N Howke and P Hargreaves “Environmental funds, compensation and liability” (2003) 2
Environmental Liability 30, 45 classify this type of environmental fund as the ‘liability
model’, as opposed to the ‘enhancement model’ whereby contributions are primarily
intended for environmental enhancement and protection, rather than remedying pollution
damage.
110 Carriers are owners or operators of vessels providing transportation to individuals or
businesses who purchase transportation services or commodities.
Ivana Zovko: Effectivenes of International Instruments of Liability and Compensation for Vessel-Sourced...1174
between the operator of the nuclear installation and the State where the in-
stallation is located, and ultimately all State parties to the liability regime.
This is not typical for the maritime domain, as the nuclear liability conventions
cover all nuclear incidents, and not solely those referring to seaborne carriage
of nuclear matter.
As can be witnessed in the 1992 Fund and the HNS Conventions, pollution
compensation funds are financed through contributions by those whose
economic activity is seen to put the environment at risk, hence by physical and
legal persons other than the shipowner or the operator. The cargo owners -
recipients, are obligated to contribute to the environmental funds in amounts
correspondent to the size of their cargo and the tonnage of the ship involved.111
Apart from the industry funds, there also exists the possibility of State
levied funds such as the public funds established on the domestic level in case
of the 1960 Paris and the 1963 Vienna Conventions and their subsequent
Protocols and amendments. The 2004 Protocols to the Paris Convention and
the 1963 Supplementary Convention, require public funds to be instituted by:
(a) the State where the nuclear installation of the primary liable operator is
located;112 (b) all contracting States.113 Similarly, the 2003 Supplementary Fund
for covering tanker oil pollution damage also envisages a minimum contribution
by State parties when the cargo owners are not obligated to contribute, hence
when the amount of contributing oil is below the prescribed minimum.114
Nonetheless, State levied Funds are rare, and in general States successfully
lobby against any such financial commitments concerning “activities whose
benefit lies in the private sector.”115 This discussion will therefore focus on
industry-levied funds.
While the notion of a pollution compensation fund as a supplementary
source of financing is already well acclaimed and realised, the idea of applying
the fund solution without the liability tier is still paper-based. In an exclusively
111 See Table 2.
112 2004 Protocol to the 1960 Paris Convention, Article 10 (amended), K (c); 2004 Protocol
to the 1963 Supplementary Convention, Article 3 (amended), b(ii).
113  2004 Protocol to the 1963 Supplementary Convention, Article 3 (amended), b(iii).
114 Protocol of 2003 to the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1992 (2003 Protocol), (in force 3 May 2005), art.
14; full text of the Protocol available from: < www.iopcfunds.org> 1 January 2005.
115 Daniel, above 6 n at 240.
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fund based compensation system, the same role players - carriers and cargo-
owners, would remain the main contributors, liability of the fund would remain
strict, and insurance coverage would also be available, including compulsory
insurance to a certain level. The amounts payable to a fund would continue to
differ depending on the contributor, ship’s tonnage, and risk involved. Ideally,
compensation under the fund would not be limited in line with the alleged
restrictions of the insurance market, but the maximum costs of the worst-case
scenario for a particular type of pollution incident.116 A fund-based system
would envisage incentives and benefits for the contributors such as a periodical
reimbursement mechanism for contributions in access of the costs of loss related
to each particular incident, and after the passage of a certain period of time.
The 1971 and 1992 IOPC Funds already follow the practice of reimbursement
of contributions for surpluses.117
Regrettably, a purely financial fund-based system for remedying vessel-
sourced pollution damage has not been adopted in any MMEA thus far. Reasons
for this may be found in the reluctance of States to reject the contemporary
system reliant on carrier’s liability and insurance cover, and the pressure of the
powerful insurance lobbies that petition against any change that may
considerably increase liability limits. What is more, the present treaty practice,
including regional instruments such as the EU White paper on environmental
liability, reflect the preference of States and the industry for a pollution
compensation fund to remain a supplement to liability rather than its
substitute.118
Some practical critiques directed against the environmental funds as opposed
to, for instance, the expanded liability of the ‘polluter’ include the dispro-
portioned costs associated with the setting up and administering of a pollution
compensation fund, in comparison to the incomparably less costly issuing of
116 Already, compensation available under the US Superfund is far greater than the 1992
IOPC Funds liability limits; see “Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act” (CERCLA) ( December 11, 1980) Title 42, U.S. Code, Sec. 9620. , as
amended in 1996.
117 For instance the 1992 IOPC Fund reimbursed on 1 March 2004 by the decision of the
Fund’s Assembly, a surplus of £ 37.7 million on the Nakhodka Major Claims Fund to
contributors; see IOPC Funds Annual Report 2004: <www.iopcfund.org/npdf/AR2003
English.pdf>1 June 2005.
118 EC White paper on environmental liability, above n 28 at 30.
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insurance certificates for carriers that can nowadays also be done electroni-
cally. Moreover, a fund may arguably double charge the cargo owners by levy-
ing contributions at a rate and in the amount far greater than that imposed
upon the shipowner. This stems from the presumption that the charges levied
from the cargo owners are already increased by the costs of environmental
regulation that is reflected in the price of transport and cargo itself, as well by
the costs incurred by the carrier, including their insurance cover.119
Nonetheless, keeping in mind the lack of other supplementary mechanisms
of compensation, the pollution compensation funds become an indispensable
factor in ensuring remedying pollution damage, whether the funds are employed
as a second tier or the central tool for compensation.
d. Liable Parties
The operator is the person that is commonly nominated as the party liable
for transboundary environmental harm in international environmental law
jargon, but various meanings are attributed to such a person. The 2004 ILC’s
Draft Principles refer to an operator as the person in command or in control of
the activity at the time the incident causing damage occurs. The meaning of a
‘person in control of the activity’ is taken to a level further in the Basel Liability
Protocol that nominates several persons with the primary responsibility over
different stages in the process of transboundary movement and disposal of
hazardous wastes.120 Environmental Protocol Annex VI, for instance, deems
an operator as any person, which organises activities to be carried out in the
Antarctic Treaty Area (ATA).121 Alternatively, the 1960 Paris Convention and
the 1997 Vienna Convention concerning nuclear incidents during shipment
of radioactive substances nominate as the primarily liable person an operator
of a nuclear installation122 that is not ‘in charge or in control of the activity’ in
the sense of the seaborne carriage of cargo. An operator liable under these
conventions is the person that had organised the transport to be performed,
and/or will benefit from this transport.
119 Howke and Hargreaves, above n 109 at 39.
120 Basel Liability Protocol, art. (4).
121 Environmental Protocol Annex VI, art. 2(c).
122 1960 Paris Convention, art. 1(a.2); 1997 Vienna Convention, art. II(1).
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The two key global liability and compensation regimes for marine pollu-
tion, the 1992 Liability and the HNS Conventions, channel liability to the
owner of the vessel,123 while expressly exonerating a number of other persons
such as the charterer, operator and the pilot from their applicability.124 Such
exclusion seems unjustified given that these persons often contribute consider-
ably, and at times are the primary cause of pollution incidents.125 Liability of
such persons can be invoked upon proof that pollution damage resulted by
their own fault when they acted with intent or recklessly to cause damage.126
However, the burden of proof falls on the claimant, and is regularly difficult to
achieve. Both the tanker oil pollution and the HNS regimes aim to counterbal-
ance the channelling of liability onto the shipowner and its limited strict liabil-
ity by establishing a pollution compensation fund as a supplementary source
of funding.
An alternative to the establishment of a fund would be to increase the
number of strictly liable parties beyond the owner or the operator of a ship.
This has been done in the Bunkers Convention and the Basel Liability
Protocol.127 The United States Oil Pollution Act (OPA 1990) is an excellent
example of a domestic instrument that provides for strict liability of the
shipowner, the operator, and the bare boat charter.128 While this idea seems
sound conceptually, it is uncertain how multiple party liability will be performed
in practice and with regard to transboundary pollution.
As neither the Bunkers Convention or the Basel Protocol have as yet come
into force, their liability models are yet to be tested. Some concerns were voiced
by Wu who pointed to the shortcomings of not channelling liability in the
Bunkers regime, warning that this will cause delays in the processing of claims
against multiple liable parties, in particular given the complex network of
multiple insurance covers.129 What is more, not all of the parties that are most
123 1992 Liability Convention, art. 3 (1); HNS Convention, art. 7.
124 1992 Liability Convention, art. 3(4); HNS Convention, art. 9 (2).
125 The Sea Empress incident was known to be caused by the pilot; see the 1971 IOPC Fund
documentation, 1971 Fund/EXC.55/19 (24 October 1997).
126 1992 Liability Convention, art. 5(2); Basel Liability Protocol, art. 5; Environmental
Protocol Annex VI, art. 9 (3).
127 Basel Liability Protocol, art. 4(1); Bunkers Convention, art. 1 (3).
128 1990 OPA, US. Pub. L.101-380 (18 August 1990).
129 C Wu “Liability and Compensation for Bunker Pollution” (2002) 33 J.Mar.L.&Com. 553.
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likely to contribute to pollution incidents were included in the list of those
potentially liable under the Bunkers Convention. For instance, time charters
should have also been added to the list of primary liable parties, as they are
responsible for supplying bunkers to the ship under the terms of their charter.130
e. Strict and Fault Based Liability
A number of additional liability based mechanisms may be employed in
order to fully cover the costs associated with environmental harm. One such
method entails differentiating between fault based and strict liability. This
system has already been employed in a number of international liability and
compensation regimes related to vessel-sourced pollution.131 There are many
arguments in favour of the strict liability132 of the polluter, usually being the
carrier and/or the cargo-owner, in particular given the difficulties in proving
fault in cases of transboundary marine pollution.133 This relates to the fact
that environmental damage is usually gradual, it is detected long after the
polluter left the place of the incident. In the context of the Southern Ocean,
ice and other polar features, as well as the vastness of the region, render detection
even more difficult. What is more, compensation for grave environmental harm
when highly hazard activities are involved, should not be restricted by the
proof of fault of the liable parties, at least to the extent that they were aware of
the hazards involved in the seaborne activities in question. Bergkamp offers a
structured line of argumentation against employing strict liability, advocating
the primacy of fault based liability for environmental harm as a principle
instead.134 It is argued here that Bergkamp’s critique primarily takes account
of the realities of the insurance world, the industries and commercial interests
130 Ibid.
131 1992 Liability Convention, art. 5(2); Basel Protocol, art. 5; Environmental Protocol Annex
VI, art. 9(3);
132 Cane, above n 96 at 45-47 differentiates between various types of strict liability for
environmental harm: conduct based liability; relationship based (link between the liable
persons and tortfeasor); and outcome based liability based on the idea of risk creation.
133 X Hanqin Transboundary Damage in International Law (2000) 33, 108 favours strict liability
in cases when the allocations of risk can be measured and calculated with reasonable
accuracy, and specifically concerning hazardous activities; for opposing view see discussion
in Bergkamp, above n 79 at 120 - 150.
134 See Bergkamp, above n 79 at 150 -161, 366-373.
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involved, while neglecting the value of the ecological component that does not
respond to the common language of economy and insurance policies. One
cannot rely on the industry to self-regulate, or not resort to various methods of
escaping liability, which are far more flexible when conditioned by the burden
of proof of fault, as opposed to strict liability. Bregkamp’s arguments for
eliminating strict liability function with the ideal background of perfectly
harmonised domestic claims settlement procedures, and when no technical
obstacles in detection of environmental damage hinder the proof of fault.
Without deconstructing the poles of thought in favour and against strict liability,
the view upheld here is that there is a place for strict liability in ensuring that
prompt and adequate compensation is available for vessel-sourced pollution
damage, regardless of the nature of the polluting activity being hazardous or
not. The distinction between the degree of risks involved should be reflected
in the portion of liability deemed strict as opposed to that left to the proof of
fault, hence through the system of financial limits of liability. It is fairer to shift
the burden of proof to the shipowner that may subsequently seek recourse
against a third party should it feel to be without fault, rather than impose it
upon the victim. It is further argued that a combination of strict and fault
based liability appears the most appropriate standard of liability in connection
with pollution damage caused by ships.
f. Unlimited and Limited Liability
Another matter to consider is the notion of unlimited liability. The formula
employed in the MMEAs such as the 1992 Liability Convention, the Basel
Protocol and the Environmental Protocol Annex VI, entails unlimited liability
for acts committed with intent or negligence, hence based on fault, as opposed
to limited liability for accidental pollution. Unlimited liability is attributed
both with respect to the strictly liable polluter, but also other persons that are
liable solely on the bases of fault.135 Specifically, the strictly liable person is
relieved of the right to limit liability when acting with intent or recklessly. The
central justification for unlimited fault based liability is that intentional and
negligent pollution are preventable actions, hence the level of liability in relation
135 This refers to servants, the master, operator, charterer and other non-primary liable per-
sons not designated as the primary liable one under the Protocol; 1992 Liability Conven-
tion, art. 3(4); Basel Protocol, art. 5.
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to them must have a stronger deterrent component as opposed to liability for
accidental pollution.136 In this sense, it will not matter that the level of
compensation awarded entails economic failure for the liable carrier, if the
objective of prevention so commands.
g. Damages with a Punitive Character and Residual State Liability
When a pollution incident is the result of an intentional or negligent act, or
consequential to violations of international environmental obligations, additi-
onal compensation could be secured through special types of damages prima-
rily aimed at exerting compliance and deterrence. This primarily relates to
awarding punitive damages payable by liable persons that acted with intent or
negligence in causing environmental harm. So far, punitive damages are exclu-
sively employed in municipal law.137 One must also note the idea of establish-
ing an obligation of restitutio in integrum for all loss suffered from environmen-
tal harm. Relevant international regimes do not preclude such a possibility
under other regimes, primarily domestic law, but they do not permit restitutio
in integrum, as this clashes with the common principle of limited liability of the
operator, and limiting compensation for pure environmental damage. It is un-
likely that either restitutio in integrum or punitive damages will be adopted in
international marine liability regimes given the resistance of the States and
industries likely to be affected. Another strong argument against such
mechanisms is the question of how the amount of these damages would be
assessed and determined.138 Another means for ensuring adequate redress is
the concept of residual State liability that thus far has been seldom included in
international treaty law. Some aspects of residual State liability may be identified
in the minimum contribution requirement levied on the State parties to the
2003 Supplementary Fund,139 or the requirement of holding public funds for
supplementary compensation as is sought under the 1997 Supplementary
Convention concerning nuclear incidents.140 Residual State liability is still to
136 See comments by Faure and Hui, above n 108 at 252-253.
137 Hanqin, above n 133 at 258; see also M-L Larsson The Law of Environmental Damage:
Liability and Reparation (1999) 395 discussing the inclination in the American tort law to
employ punitive damages.
138 See Hanqin, Ibid.
139 2003 Protocol to the 1992 Fund Convention, art. 14.
140 1997 Supplementary Convention, Chapter III (Compensation).
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attract the necessary recognition as a valid subsidiary means of compensation
for transboundary environmental harm.
h. Sovereign Immunity of Public Vessels
As a general rule, warships, naval auxiliary or other ships owned or operated by
a State and used only on government non-commercial services (public vessels)141
enjoy a privileged status in international law through the institute of sovereign
immunity. Such ships are in principle exempt from the application of interna-
tional regimes concerning the protection and preservation of the marine envi-
ronment. Sovereign immunity in the maritime context may entail the guaran-
tee of non-application of an entire international agreement or a number of its
parts, to public vessels. It may also refer to exemption of public vessels from
domestic jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State, in view of claims
arising under an applicable international agreement.
The guarantee of sovereign immunity is particularly disconcerting when
considering that military vessels are a significant contributing factor to marine
pollution. This is even more evident in the case of the Southern Ocean south
of 60(S since most of the vessels sailing this region are State owned and/or
operated. While military activities are prohibited in the region, the passage of
military vessels and warships is permitted.142 What is more, a particular problem
to consider is the qualification of government owned and operated vessels
engaging in research activities in the Southern Ocean as vessels on non-
commercial governmental activity, hence enjoying sovereign immunity privileges
and being left outside the uniform international systems of liability and redress.
While the guarantee of immunity of public vessels from enforcement under
foreign jurisdiction is understandable as a manifestation of State sovereignty,
it seems unwarranted to lower the bar entirely by placing public ships outside
the generally adopted marine environmental regimes such as UNCLOS or
MARPOL. Specifically, both UNCLOS and MARPOL exempt public vessels
from compliance with their provisions concerning protection and preservation
of the marine environment. Both agreements, however, require flag States to
141 J S Dehner “Vessel-source pollution and public vessels: sovereign immunity v. compli-
ance, implications for international environmental law” (1995) 9 Emory Int’ L Rev 507
employs the term ‘public vessel’.
142 Antarctic Treaty, art. 1.
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adopt appropriate measures so as to ensure that public vessels “act in a manner
consistent, so far as is reasonable and practicable, with this Convention,” but
solely to the extent that the said measures do not impair the operations or
operational capabilities of public ships.143 The requirement of adopting
appropriate measures in line with UNCLOS or MARPOL is without real
substance given its vague and ambiguous language, as well as in reality being
completely unenforceable. Specifically, the flag State will determine which
measures are appropriate and necessary in accordance with international law.
Consequently, violations of the flag State imposed ‘appropriate measures’
for public ships may be deemed punishable, and pollution damage characterised
as compensable, only when the domestic law of that same flag State so permits.
In addition, UNCLOS expressly guarantees complete immunity for public
vessels from jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State.144 There exists
no control mechanism concerning the compatibility of the activities of public
ships with UNCLOS or MARPOL other than by the very flag State, and perhaps
through the highly indolent and seldom used mechanism of State responsibility.
With regard to treaties concerning liability and compensation, the 1992
Liability Convention, the HNS Convention, the Bunkers Convention, and
Annexes IV (marine pollution) and Annex VI (environmental liability) to the
Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty, explicitly do not apply to public
vessels. In addition, the IOPC Fund expressly redeems itself of the obligation
to pay compensation when such ships caused pollution damage.145 The 1962
Nuclear ships Convention is the sole global instrument in international maritime
law that extends its application to all vessels including war ships. It is largely
for this very reason that this Convention never came into force.
In the end, while it is not to be expected that the sovereign immunity clause
will ever be entirely lifted, much can be done to prevent pollution from public
vessels, and ensure that any damage resulting from them is compensable in a
prompt, adequate and timely manner. One way of achieving this is by having
143 UNCLOS, art. 236; MARPOL, art. 3(3); see also 1926 International convention for the
unification of certain rules concerning the immunity of state-owned ships, with the Protocol of 24
May 1934, 176 LNTS 199, (in force 8 January 1937).
144 UNCLOS, art. 95, 96.
145 1992 Liability Convention, art. 11(1); 1992 Fund Convention, art. 4(2a), HNS
Convention, art. 4(4);  Bunkers Convention, art. 4(2); Environmental Protocol Annex
VI, art. VI(5), Environmental Protocol Annex IV (marine pollution), art. 11.
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the IMO attempt to gather reports concerning pollution by public vessels. The
IMO, as well as the international community, should also engage further in
ensuring that flag States develop national environmental liability regimes
applicable to their public vessels in the same scope as the international regime
in place for commercial vessels.
4.2. Prevention
International liability and compensation regimes contribute to pollution
prevention given that they attribute harmful consequences for inflicted
environmental harm to the polluter. Liability in general is designed as one of
the many subsidiary means of deterrence. Strict liability as envisaged in the
international maritime liability and compensation schemes, is not a strong
deterrent given that its primary focus is placed on providing compensation,
rather than punishing/deterring the polluter. It is the amount of damages
awarded on account of pollution damage, which determines the potentially
preventive effect. Liability holds greater importance in pollution prevention
when damage is the result of someone’s negligence or intent, rather than being
purely accidental. But even in this case, only when the liability is defined as
unlimited, or when the set limits go beyond the threshold of reasonableness,
can preventive effect of fault liability be significant. Limits of strict liability are
presently at an inadequate level so as to deter polluters.146
Prevention through liability and the award of damages would best be achieved
by punitive damages in cases when the polluter acted with intent and malice in
causing environmental harm. Punitive damages would be particularly effective
when attributed solely based on the violation of an environmental obligation,
or the threat of environmental harm, regardless of whether injurious conse-
quences occurred or not. Similarly, it is not the international liability and com-
pensation regimes that will ever assume the role, or be the most effective deter-
rents.147 The central role lies with regulatory mechanisms, and maximising
cooperation between States, in particular capacity building and technical
146 Bergkamp, above n 79 at 95: “Liability’s deterrence objective thus does not require a
strict liability regime for environmental damage.”
147 Faure and Hui, above n 108 at 253 argue that “legal remedies can only, to a limited
extent, hope to influence the behaviour of social actors.”
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assistance to developing States and States in transition. Domestic environ-
mental liability regimes, and in some cases regional ones, will have a stronger
deterrent component as they often employ instruments such as unlimited fault
liability, imposing of punitive damages, and in case of the EU, even criminal
liability for vessel-sourced pollution.148
4.3. Effectiveness through Implementation, Compliance and
Enforcement
The connection between effectiveness and the degree of enforcement of
and compliance with an international regime is self-evident. A regime that is
not enforced or complied with is destined to fail. Given that apart from the
nuclear and tanker oil pollution regimes, no other relevant regime is in force,
the issue is one of implementation, as much as enforcement. One must be
cautious and note that neither the broad participation of the international
community in a treaty regime, nor the high level of compliance, is a guarantee
of effectiveness in the sense that an international liability instrument will achieve
its goal of providing effective remedy. Still, it is necessary to look to reasons
why states are not implementing and enforcing international instruments on
liability and redress that they have signed.
4.3.1. The Problem of Implementation
Kiss emphasises that “States that have voluntarily negotiated, drafted, and
adopted an international instrument comply with the agreement which is the
final product of their efforts.”149 Why is it then that states that have adopted
MMEAs concerning liability and redress have failed to implement them beyond
any reasonable time limit? In case of the 1996 HNS Convention for instance,
this limit has reached 10 years. These delays in ratification are often attributable
to the slow domestic administrative procedures that can be the result of a
148 2005 EU Directive on ship source pollution and the introduction of penalties for infringements
2005/35/EC, (OJ L 255/11 of 30 September 2005).
149 A Kiss ‘Commentary and Conclusions’ in D Shelton (ed) Commitment and Compliance:
The Role of Non-binding Norms in the International Legal System (2000) 223, 242.
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change in diplomatic representatives responsible for a particular treaty, or be-
cause a more pressing issue has taken priority in the relevant governmental
department. Moreover, states often wait for one another to ratify a treaty,
carefully choosing the time for it to come into force. Smaller states often rely
on the guidance of strong states. Further issues arise when domestic legal systems
do not correspond with the adopted international rules and regulations.
The reality is that developing countries and countries in transition often
sign or adhere to treaties without having the right domestic infrastructure, the
know-how or the funds to implement and enforce them. Other elements
impeding upon implementation and enforcement refer to costs associated with
these processes. This includes expenses intrinsic to the establishment of the
convention’s secretariat; providing technical assistance; setting up and managing
a pollution compensation fund, and other. However, in some cases delays in
ratification are difficult to comprehend. For example, in case of the 2001 Bunkers
Convention, Australia was the state that made the first proposal for such an
international instrument in 1994, and was a part of the initiative and later on
the negotiating team for this convention until its adoption in 2001.150 Australia
to date has not ratified the Bunkers Convention, and neither have any of the
six countries, apart from South Africa, that submitted the 1996 Joint Statement
advocating the need for such an international agreement before the IMO Legal
Committee.151
4.3.2. Non-Compliance
There are many factors that may lead to compliance with an international
norm. They include presence of non-compliance mechanisms, enforcement
measures, trade sanctions and dispute resolution procedures accompanying a
particular international instrument. It is argued here that the effectiveness in
achieving environmental goals, as well as effectiveness as per compliance, is
attained through processes originating predominately from the realm of internal
relations and external to international law. Therefore, the role of coercive
enforcement instruments is of subsidiary relevance. States rarely and reluctantly
150 See Wu, above n 129 at 554.
151 For the status of the Ballast Water Convention, see the IMO:
<www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D12617/status.xls> 1 August 2005.
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resort to methods such as dispute resolution procedures, invocation of State
responsibility, trade and other sanctions, to compel obedience from defiant
States. While the threat of sanction may be an incentive for a State to act in
line with an international instrument, state practice has proven that this is not
the primary means for exerting obedience. From the perspective of legal theory,
Koh reasons “voluntary obedience, not forced compliance, must be the preferred
enforcement mechanism.”152
Some of the non-coercive means of compelling obedience as viewed by the
two leading legal scholars Franck and Chayeses include:
If Nations must regularly justify their actions to treaty partners…they are
more likely to obey it…. 153
and
If nations internally “perceive” a rule to be fair…they are more likely to
obey it.154
Therefore, two of the primary instruments for enforcement of international
law include: (a) applying pressure by other participating States in the same
MMEA or an IER; and (b) effective incorporation of an international instrument
into domestic regimes as a process of legitimising international norms. As for
the former, the pressure can be exerted through political bargaining as per the
system of concessions and reprisals in various areas of interstate cooperation,
especially trade issues. This technique is particularly popular among the
countries of the industrialised north. The key element of effective internalisation
of international liability regimes refers to developing domestic regimes of liability
and redress that are harmonised with the relevant international instruments.
In general, there exists a consensus among scholars that effective integration
of international law into domestic systems is among the primary instigators of
compliant behaviour.155
152 H H Koh “Why nations obey international law” (1997) 106 Yale Law Journal 2599,
2645; for an account of bibliography relating to compliance with international law, see
W C Bradford “International Legal Compliance: and annotated bibliography” (2004) 30
N.C.J.Int’l L.&Com.Reg. 379.
153 Koh account of Chayeses, above n 152 at 2645; see also A Chayes and A H Chayes The
New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (1995).
154 Koh account of Franck, ibid; see also Franck, above n 83.
155 C Giraud-Kinley “The Effectiveness of International Law: Sustainable Development in
the South Pacific Region” (1999) 12 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 125, 170 notes that “the
effectiveness of international law as its capacity to be implemented at the international
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In addition, Mrema identifies a list of effective non-coercing means of en-
forcement including diplomatic and management measures such as the use of
financial measures, capacity building, reporting requirements and compliance
monitoring.156 Chayeses also suggests a list of potential non-forceful mecha-
nisms: transparency; reporting and data collection; verification and monitor-
ing; dispute settlement; and strategic review and assessment.157 Examples of
monitoring and reporting as non-compliance mechanisms can be found in the
1992 Fund Convention concerning tanker oil pollution. Specifically, the mem-
ber-States to the 1992 Fund are obligated to submit reports on oil received in
one calendar year, and monitor the timely submission of these reports. How-
ever, in view of the IOPC Fund’s Assembly, there are no legal grounds for
imposing sanctions on member States that fail to submit the reports,158 and no
sanctions have been asserted thus far. Similarly, consultations and negotia-
tions are in progress concerning “giving teeth” to the non-compliance proce-
dures established under the HNS Convention, that refer to member States
failing to report on the amounts of the received hazardous cargo in the calendar
year. No progress has been made in this respect so far.
Furthermore, one must also acknowledge that compliance by both States
and non-state target actors will depend on the cost-benefit ratio. As the 2003
OECD Report illustrated, it remains cheaper to pollute the marine environment
than to comply with strict environmental standards.159 If the disobedient non-
and national levels ... the effectiveness of international law ... is ultimately measured
according to its enforcement at the local level.”; Koh, above n 86 at 2659 emphasizes
that the key element in obedience of international regimes is their reaffirmation in the
form of “internally binding domestic legal obligation” through processes such as judicial
description, legislative embodiment, or executive acceptance.
156 See Elizabeth Mrema, Senior Legal Officer, UNEP DEPI, presentation at the 2005 Summer
Course on Environmental Law-Making and Diplomacy, Joensuu, Finland: < file:///C:/
Documents%20and%20Settings/ivanaz/Local%20Settings/Temporary%20Internet%20
Files/Content.IE5/ODQRGP2V/295,1,  CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES IN  COMPLIANCE
AND ENFORCEMENT OF MEAs>, 1 October 2005 (the course was attended by the
author).
157 Chayeses in Koh, above n 152 at 2637.
158 The only possible sanction identified by the 1992 IOPC Fund Assembly is taking the
non-submission of oil reports into account when electing members of the Executive
Committee of the IOPC Funds; IOPC Funds Doc. 92FUND/A.10/14/1: < www.iopcfund-
docs.org/ds/pdf/92a10-14-1_71ac17-9-1-sfaes1-8-1_e.pdf> 1 August 2005.
159 OECD Report, above n 13.
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-state targeted actors are also a powerful lobby group in one of the participat-
ing States, it is likely that that State will allow such disobedience, and hence
be itself in violation of the international instrument. Finally, the number of
state parties, and the participation of the leading maritime and FOC coun-
tries, are also factors adding to a regime’s effectiveness. In case of the Southern
Ocean, Environmental Protocol Annex VI fails in this respect, given that not
one of its State parties is an FOC country.
International institutions such as the UNEP and the IMO have undertaken
to resolve the problems in non-compliance and lack of enforcement by
developing a number of techniques and mechanisms for ensuring enforcement
and compliance in international environmental law. For instance, the 2002
UNEP Guidelines on Compliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral Environmen-
tal Agreements160 advise states on a step-by-step basis of the many aspects of the
infrastructure that should evolve around an international agreement so as to
ensure its enforcement and compliance. In the context of the prevention and
remedying of environmental harm caused by ships, one such specific method
is black listing non-complainant ports and FOC countries.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has demonstrated that the present formula of ‘strict liability
plus reasonable compensation’ in relation to vessel-sourced environmental
damage, suffers many shortcomings resulting in the complete lack of regulatory
response regarding certain types of pollution incidents, the delayed coming
into force of the negotiated treaties, and the incompleteness of the international
regimes which are in force. Regimes in relation to highly hazardous activities
have been established, and out of those only the tanker oil pollution regime is
enforced successfully. The number of negotiated treaties that are not imple-
mented or complied with reveals the inconsistency between actual States’ po-
sitions concerning international liability for environmental harm and the atti-
tudes expressed in the negotiated and adopted international agreements. This
study questioned international civil liability as the most appropriate means by
which to keep raising the bar when it comes to the level of compensation
available concerning pure environmental damage. Following analysis, it appears
160 UNEP Publication, Nov. 2002.
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that strict liability of a carrier, without supplementary means of compensation
such as funds and compulsory insurance, is not effective in covering loss
pursuant to vessel-sourced pollution. The tanker oil pollution regime as the
most successful mechanism establishes three tiers of liability, also having
gradually increased the shipowner’s and the IOPC funds’ liability limits. It is
important to note however that this international regime is an anomaly in the
regular progression of international environmental liability law. Its driving force
- the high financial and power stakes, as well as the frequency and gravity of
incidents, are not characteristic of other types of marine pollution.
The paper outlined a number of concrete measures that should be incorpo-
rated in any future, and wherever possible, in the existing international re-
gimes of liability and redress. These include:
• Enabling full restoration of environmental damage per se;
• Envisaging liability for environmental harm on the high seas;
• Increasing the number of primary and strictly liable persons;
• Higher level of limits to strict liability in line with the average costs
projections for covering a specific type of loss, rather than dubious ‘insurance
market capacity’;
• Unlimited liability for intentional and negligent pollution, including
prescription of punitive damages where possible;
• Re-affirmation of the concept of unlimited fault-based international civil
liability;
• Attributing liability for the threat of pollution arising from violations of
environmental rules and standards;
• Introducing punitive damages at least in cases of intentional or negligent
pollution involving hazardous activities;
• Expanding on the use of compulsory insurance and State and industry levied
pollution compensation funds;
• Applying international regimes of pollution prevention to public vessels;
• Imposing obligation on State parties to institute domestic regimes correspon-
dent to the international ones for its public vessels; and
• Maximising the role of States in loss allocation schemes through residual
State liability.
As for the role of international rules of liability and compensation in exerting
prevention of pollution, any such contribution is limited, in particular with
regard to employing liability in international law for compliance with pollution
prevention regulations. Much has to change in the perception of the internati-
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onal community before the key measures of enforcement and deterrence through
liability such as punitive measures, unlimited liability, or compulsory insur-
ance for all carriers, are introduced in the international maritime sphere. Fi-
nally, it is a fact that in the case of vessel-sourced pollution, the relevant re-
gimes are at present ineffective through their inactivity. However, the problem
lies not in the lack of enforcement and compliance mechanisms, but the fact
that global, comprehensive and legally binding instruments of liability and
redress have been negotiated without the negotiating States having been truly
capable of implementing the adopted measures in their domestic law, and with
serious concerns about the possibility of compliance. Ultimately, an interna-
tional instrument can only be considered effective when the processes of nego-
tiations and implementation do not render its development insignificant, and
as long as it can be successfully enforced and complied with.
Saæetak
Ivana Zovko*
U»INKOVITOST ME–UNARODNIH INSTRUMENATA U SLU»AJU
ODGOVORNOSTI I NAKNADE ©TETE ZBOG ONE»I©∆ENJA
S BRODOVA: SLU»AJ JUÆNOG OCEANA
Iako je odreeni broj meunarodnopravnih instrumenata koji ureuju pitanja naknade
πtete i odgovornosti u pogledu zagaivanja pomorskog okoliπa od strane brodova dogovoren,
ili Ëak stupio na snagu, njihova uËinkovitost je upitna, kao i sama pravna sredstva i
principi koje promoviraju. Ovaj Ëlanak propituje uËinkovitost relevantnih meunarodno-
pravnih instrumenata u tri vida: (a) sposobnost osiguranja pravovremene i odgovarajuÊe
naknade za “Ëistu ekoloπku πtetu”; (b) prevencija zagaivanja od strane brodova uopÊe;
(c) razmjer primjenjivosti, izvrπavanja i poπtovanja meunarodnopravnih instrumenata
kao mjera njihove uËinkovitosti. Problem primjerenosti meunarodnopravnih instrumenata
za naknadu ekoloπke πtete sagledava se na primjeru πtete nanesene samom pomorskom
okoliπu (Ëiste ekoloπke πtete), za razliku od πtete na stvarima i osobama. Predmetna
analiza provedena je na primjeru Juænog oceana. Naime, Juæni ocean kao i Mediteran,
* Ivana Zovko, dipl. iur., doktorska kandidatkinja na Pravnom fakultetu SveuËiliπta u
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ukljuËuje zone pod nadleænosti obalne dræave, kao i otvoreno more, te uæiva zaπtitu pod
opÊim meunarodnopravnim kao i posebnim regionalnim sustavom zaπtite i oËuvanja
pomorskog okoliπa. Osim toga, najnoviji regionalni pravni instrument za odgovornost i
naknadu ekoloπke πtete je upravo Aneks Protokolu za zaπtitu okoliπa, Ugovora o Antarktici,
koji je donesen 17. lipnja 2005. i primjenjiv je na Juæni ocean.
KljuËne rijeËi: meunarodno pravo zaπtite i oËuvanja pomorskog okoliπa, zagaivanje
pomorskog okoliπa od strane brodova, uËinkovitost meunarodnopravnih instrumenata
za odgovornost i naknadu Ëiste ekoloπke πtete, Juæni ocean
Zusammenfassung
Ivana Zovko**
DIE EFFIZIENZ INTERNATIONALER INSTRUMENTE BEI
HAFTUNG UND SCHADENSERSATZ WEGEN VERUNREINIGUNG
DURCH SCHIFFE: DER FALL DES SÜDLICHEN OZEANS
Obwohl eine Reihe von völkerrechtlichen Instrumenten zur Regelung von Schaden-
sersatz und Haftung hinsichtlich der Verschmutzung der maritimen Umwelt durch Schiffe
vereinbart wurden oder auch in Kraft getreten sind, ist ihre Effizienz ebenso wie die
Instrumente selbst und die Grundsätze, für die sie stehen, fagwürdig. Dieser Beitrag
untersucht die Effizienz der relevanten völkerrechtlichen Instrumente auf drei Aspekte
hin: (a) die Fähigkeit, rechtzeitigen und angemessenen Schadensersatz für „reinen
Umweltschaden“ zu leisten; (b) die Verhütung der Verschmutzung durch Schiffe als
solcher; (c) das Verhältnis der Anwendbarkeit, der Durchsetzung  und der Beachtung
der völkerrechtlichen Instrumente als Maßstab ihrer Effizienz. Das Problem der
Angemessenheit der völkerrechtlichen Instrumente für den Schadensersatz bei Umwelts-
chäden wird anhand des Beispiels eines der maritimen Umwelt direkt zugefügten Schadens
(reiner Umweltschaden) im Unterschied zu Personen- und Sachschaden behandelt. Die
gegenständliche Analyse wurde am Beispiel des Südlichen Ozeans durchgeführt. Dieser
umfasst nämlich wie auch das Mittelmeer Zonen unter der Ingerenz des jeweiligen
Küstenstaates wie auch die offene See und steht unter dem Schutz allgemeiner völker-
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rechtlicher Normen wie auch besonderer regionaler Vorschriften zum Schutz und zur
Erhaltung der maritimen Umwelt. Das jüngste regionale Rechtsinstrument für Haftung
und Schadensersatz bei Umweltschäden stellt der Annex zum Umweltschutzprotokoll
des Antarktisvertrages dar, der am 17. Juni 2005 vereinbart wurde und für den Südlichen
Ozean gilt.
Schlüsselwörter: Völkerrecht im Bereich Schutz und Erhaltung der maritimen Umwelt,
Verschmutzung der maritimen Umwelt durch Schiffe, Effizienz völkerrechtlicher
Instrumente für die Haftung und den Schadensersatz bei reinen Umweltschäden, Südlicher
Ozean
